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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE 0'F UTAH
CONTINENTAL THRIFT AND
LOAN CO~IP ANY, a Utah corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

I
I

Case No. 9837

-vs.J. CLYDE HUNT and
JESSE L. :McCABE,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPO·NDENT.'S REPLY BRIEF
STATE11ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action is a suit on a promissory note and an
appeal frmn the District Court's award of attorne'Ys fees
to the plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWE:R COURT
The trial court at the request of the defendants'
counsel, had two separate hearings. On the first hearing
the court granted the plaintiff judgment for all sums due
under the note. At the second hearing the court determined the amount of attorneys fees to be awarded the
plaintiff's attorneys and entered jdugment therefor. The
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appellant appealed only from the second judgment fixing
the amount of attorneys fees.
RELIEF SOUGH·T ON APPEAL
The respondent opposes the position of the appellants
and seeks a judgment of the appellate court sustaining
the findings and judgment of the trial court.
ST.ATEMEN1T OF F AOTS
The plaintiff-respondent, hereinafter referred to as
plaintiff, brought an action on a promissory note against
the defendants-appellants, hereinafter refe·rred to as
defendants, to recover the sum of $5,038.64, together
with interest and attorneys fees. (R. 1.) The defendant,
J. Clyde Hunt, filed an answer attacking the sufficiency
of the complaint, denying liability on the note and denying the amount of attnrney's fees requested was reasonable. In the prayer of Iris answer he asked for a determination of the indebtedness under t'he note and a determination of the attorneys fees to be paid and asked
the court to order a sale of the security for the note to
be applied against the indebtedness found to be due.
(R. 3) The security for the note was a vehicle, which
vehicle had been removed from the State of Utah and in
large part destroyed, so tlmt the plaintiff had, for all
practical purposes, lost the security of the note. (R. 9,
lines 22-30.) Subsequent to the filing of the action the
defendant, Hunt, took possession of the remnants of the
truck in Arizona on the theory that he could re·alize a
better price instead of having the plaintiff attempt to
recover the same and liquidate it to apply on the note.
2
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The plaintiff waived its security with the consent of the
defendant. (R. 9, lines 22-30, R. 10, lines 1-11.) The
defendants stipulated in open court to treat the note as
unsecured and to take over whatever fue defendant could
salvage of the vehicle.
"MR. HYDE: Well, as I understand it, they
want to treat this as unsecured and take over the
property and we are agreeable to that.
THE COURT : Then the Court has no objection." (R. 10, lines 9-12.)
Prior to the hearing of this matter the defendant
J. Clyde Hunt, moved the court for an order determining
the amount of attorneys fees to be paid to the plaintiff
in the action (R. 6) and a hearing on this motion and a
motion of the plaintiff was heard on N ove,mber 9, 1962,
at 10 :30 o'clock A.M. before the Honorable l\ierrill C.
Faux. At the outset of the hearing the defendant's
counsel announced to the court that they were: prepared
to pay the amount due under the note and asked the
court to determine and fix the amount of attorneys fees
that the plaintiff was entitled to for the bringing of this
action.
"MR. PACE : * * * We are prepared to offer
it to Court and tender to Court the total .amount
of indebtedness due, your Honor, and we would
like to have the Court determine the amount of
attorney's fees due and this would probably then
be the only issue before the Court. I only suggest
-." (R. 9, lines 9-13.)
"MR. HYDE: We will be, happy to have the
ruling of the Court on the issue of attorney's fees
in the matter." ( R. 9, lines 18-19.)
3
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The plaintiff then, in order to establish the runount
due under the note exclusive of attorney's fees for the
bringing of the action, presented invoices to the court and
to defendant's counsel in open court, which invoices were
expenses incurred in the preservation and recovery of
the security for the note and both counsel stipulated that
the costs should be allowed, including some attorney's fees
paid to lawyers in Arizona for preserving the security,
but reserving for a future hearing the issue of what
attorneys fees should be allowed to the plaintiff for the
bringing of the suit on the note. It was revealed to
plaintiff's counsel for the first time at the hearing that
the defendant, Hunt, had acually truken possession of the
vehicle and plaintiff's counsel framed the stipulation
entered into between counsel setting forth that defendant's counsel had agreed to pay all sums due under the
note, together with the bills submitted to the court and
counsel covering the costs of attempting to preserve the
security in the State of Arizona and reserving only the
issue of the amount of attorney's fees to he allowed the
plaintiff for the bringing of the suit. It was agreed
that the hearing on the attorney's fees would be a separate matter to be heard at a later date. (R. 11, lines 2230, R. 12, lines 1-21.) Defendant's attorney agreed with
the stipulation as framed:
"MR. P ..ACE : Your Honor, Mr. Hyde has
essentially stated the truth of our position. We
are willing to pay the principal of the note, plus
interest, plus the attorney's fees they had to
pay in Arizona to preserve the security." (R. 12,
lines 22-25.)

4
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The court entered a judgment in accordance with
the stipulation, reserving the issue of the amount of attorney's fees to be allowed the plaintiff for a subsequent
hearing. (R. 67-68.) The court at a subsequent hearing
on K ovember 23, 1962, pursuant to the stipulation that
the court could hear the evidence and fix the attorney's
fpes, made findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees.
The statement of facts outlined in appellants' brief
is not correct and while most of the statements made are
not relevant to the issues we feel that these inaccuracies
should be corrected.
1. :Mr. I-Iunt was not an accommodation endorser
but was a co-maker on the note with Jesse L. McCabe.

2. The defendant, J. Clyde Hunt, did not learn of
the default on the promissory note in September, 1962,
as stated in appellants' brief. 1\Ir. Hunt met with the
company attorney and with Mr. David Thomas, an employee of the plaintiff, in July, 1962, at which meeting
:Mr. Hunt prmnised to bring the note current within
seven days. (R. 51, lines 11-30.) He did not bring the
payments current and the plaintiff referred the note to
its attorney in August, 1962 for suit. (R. 53, lines 9-11.)
Thereafter efforts were made to get Mr. Hunt to rewrite the note and bring the payments current but Mr.
Hunt refused to do so, and left the office of the attorneys
refusing to execute a new note or to bring the payments
current. ~Ir. Hunt and his partner, Mr. Kartchner, stated
to the company counsel that if the company did not' ac5
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cept a settlement on their terms the company might get
nothing because an attorney had advised them that Mr.
Hunt had a defense to the note. By reason of the refusal of the defendant, Hunt, to cooperate in re-writing
the loan the company was forced to file suit. (R. 45-47.)
3. It is untrue that counsel refused to "extend to
the defendant, J. Clyde Hunt, the papers necessary to
retrieve the security." As the record will show, Mr.
Hunt and Mr. Kartchner came into counsel's office, were
extremely surley and stated, "There won't be any rewriting of the note. We are not going to sign any other
documents with reference to this matter.'' (R. 46.)
4. The statement that counsel withdrew any offer
of settlement after the answer was filed is not true.
Efforts to settle the dispute were snnply not fruitful, the
parties being unable to agree on the terms.
5. The statement that the court wrongfully entered
the judgment after an agreement had been 1nade that the
judgment would only be entered if the check tendered
into court did not clear, is untrue and unsupported by
the record. It was agreed that as a courtesy to :Jir. Hunt
the judgment would be held by the court until the court
fixed the attorneys fees to be paid under the note and in
the event the defendant paid all sums due the matter
would be dismissed. The defendant refused to pay the
sums due and the court thereupon, on N o;vember 23, 1962,
entered the judgment of record as the parties had agreed.
(R. 26.) The statement that the judgment was filed on
the 16th day of November, 1962, is not true. The clerk's
6
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stamp shows that the judginent dated the 16th day of
Novembe'r, 1962, was held by the court pursuant to the
agreement until the further hearing on November 23,
1962, (R. 67) and the failure of the defendant to pay the
sums ordered by the court to be paid resulted in the judgment being filed after the last hearing on November 23,
1962.
6. The statement that the testimony showed that
attorneys for the plaintiff spent only 1.1 hours on the
case i,s false. The testimony of counsel, when called as a
witness by the defendant, demonstrated that the case
was received in the middle of August, 1962, and involved
a number of very complex problems, including an action
in the State of Arizona arising out of the theft of parts
which were placed upon the truck, and that a great deal
of time was spent on the suit between the middle of
August and the end of N ove·mber when the matter was
final1y concluded. (R. 37-60.) At the end of the testimony with reference to what had been done in the· case
Mr. Pace hi1nself stated "I think we could come to the
conclusion, there is no question here but that Mr. Hyde
is entitled to attorney's fees, I think I would stipulate
to that." (R. 59, lines 29-30, R. 60, line 1.) The reference
to the 1.1 hours undoubtedly arises from the memorandum of counsel introduced to show the date upon
which the effort to settle the case took place. That conference consumed 1.1 hours. It is difficult to see how
counsel could be mislead into stating at page 14 of his
brief that the testimony for the plaintiff "dedicated one
and one-tenth hours (l-1/10) to this case" when the
record clearly shows a great deal of time was involved
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and a great many complicated issues and problems were
involved, many of whieh were caused by the wrongful
removal of the mortgaged property.
ARGU:JIENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT - APPELLANT HAVING S'TIPULATED IN THE LOWER COURT AS TO ALL ISSUES EXCEPT THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE ALLOWED THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED
TO RAISE THE ISSUES CONTAINED IN POINTS I, II AND
IV OF HIS BRIEF ON APPEAL.

As set forth in our statement of facts above, defendant's counsel stipulated that the defendant was liable on
the note, agreed to pay the costs of preserving the security for the note and, in fact, agreed to the amount
and form of the judgment signed by the court on the 16th
day of November, 1962. (R. 67-68.) As set forth above
in the statement of facts, defendant's counsel acknowledged that the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable
attorneys fee at the first hearing and even after the second hearing defendant's counsel acknowledged that the
plaintiff was entitled to attorneys fees.
"~IR. PACE: Well, Your Honor, I think
there is the-I think we could come to the conclusion, there is no question here but what :Mr. Hyde
is entitled to attorney's fees, I think I zcould stipulate. to that." (Underscoring supplied) R. 59, lines
28-30, R. 60, line 1.)

Thus, defendant's counsel of his own motion asked
the court to fi.-...: an attorneys fee for the plaintiff (R. 6),
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acknowledged at the first hearing that the court should
grant attorneys fees to the plaintiff (R. 12, lines 4-26,
R. 13, lines 17-23, R. 15, lines 7-13), and as cited above,
when the final hearing with reference to the mnount of
attorneys fees was closed defendant-appellant's counsel
stipulated that the plaintiff was entitled to attorneys
fees and submitted the matter for the court to determine
how much these attorneys fees should be. The court
made its determination and entered separate findings
and a separate judgment fixing the amount of the attorneys fees. (R. 69-72.)
Point I of the appellant's brief is devoted solely to
the point that the plaintiff did not properly pursue the
security given for t!he note and, therefore, the court
should not have entered judgment. This defense, if it
ever could have been a defense, w.as certainly stipulated
away at the hearings as set forth above.
Point II of the appellant's brief complains that the
court, after having signed the judgment as agreed by
both counsel after the first hearing, subsequently filed
the judgment of record. This action by the court was
never objected to or appealed from and is not properly
a point which the respondent should be required to reply to since it was not raised as an issue either in the
lower court by way of objection to the court's action or
in the defendant's notice of appeal.
Point IV of the appellant's brief is devoted to the
theory that the defendant-appellant is entitled to a credit
against the attorneys fees awarded to the plaintiff of
9
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bills paid by the plaintiff to preserve and protect the
security in the State of Arizona. These smns were specifically agreed to in open court as costs which the plaintiff should be entitled to and the court included them in
the judgment entered on the 16th day of K ovember, 1962.
"'The defendant, in open court, acknowledged
liability under the note and agreed to pay the
sum prayed for in the complaint, together with
interest thereon, and in addition thereto the costs
incident to the recovery and preservation of the
mortgaged property in Arizona." (R. 67.)
The parties further agreed that the only remaining
issue in the suit to be determined was the amount of attorney's fees that should be allowed the plaintiff.
"It was further agreed that the only remaining
issue in the case was the runount of attorney's fees
that should be allowed plaintiff's attorney for the
bringing of this action." (R. 68.)
The parties, having by stipulation in the lower court
limited the remaining issues and having agreed on all
other issues, should not be permitted to put in their
briefs 1natte·r ·which does not relate to the only remaining issue, to-wit, the reasonablness of the attorneys fees
fixed by the lower court.
POINT II.
THE APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAL FROM THE
JUDGMENT COMPLAINED OF IN POINTS I, II, AND IV
AND THESE POINTS SHOULD BE STRICKEN FROM APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND CANNOT BE RAISED ON APPEAL.

10
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B.ule 73 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
"The notice of appeal shall specify the parties talking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from;" (underscoring supplied)
As heretofore stated in this memorandum, the court
entered two separate judgments. One, on N ovemher 16,
1962, which judgment incorporated the stipulated liability of the defendant in all respects except what attorneys fees should be assessed against the defendant in
this action. (R. 67-68.) Two, on November 27, 1962,
after a separate hearing, the court rendered a second
judgment fixing and awarding the amount of attorney's
fees that the plaintiff was entitled to have. (R. 72.) The
defendant did not appeal fro1n the first judgment. The
notice of appeal (R. 82) appeals only "from that judgment detennining attorneys fees on a promissory note
made to order of the plaintiff on ~fay 18, 1961, which
said judgment was duly entered in the above entitled
court on the 27th day of November, 1962." (R. 82.) The
appellant does not appeal from the judgment of N ovember 16, 1962, and expressly limits his notice of appeal to
the judgn1ent granting attorneys fees.
In the case of Sierra Nevada Mill Co. 'V. Keith
O'Brien Co., -!8 U. 12, 156 P. 943, the court, in dismissing
the appellant's brief, laid down the rule as follows:
"But the notice of appeal should itself so
sufficiently describe and identify the judgment
appealed from as to show what was intended without resorting to the pleadings or the findings.
Nor, since there is but one judgment, can it be said

11
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that the notice of appeal should be regarded as
directed to that judgment~ That would but lead
to a holding that, when there is but one judgment,
no description of it in the notice of appeal is required, or that any misfit description is good.
That is not what the atdhorit.ies teach. They are
to the effect that the notice of appeal must sufficiently describe the judgment or order appealed
from so as to leave no doubt as tn its identity."
Sierra Nevada Mill Co. 'li. Keith O'Brien Co., 48
U.12, 156 P. 948, p. 946.
It should be noted that in the above case there was
not two judgments but only one and the court lleld that
the failure to identify the single judgment specifically
enough was fatal to the appeal. In this cas.e there are
two judgments entered on separate dates and relating
to separate matters as a result of separate hearings and
the appellant has appealed only from the judgment relating to the award of attorneys fees and not from the
judgment which involved issues raised in Points I, II,
and IV of appellant's brief.
POINT III.
THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED BY
THE OOURT WAS BASED UPON COMPETENT EVIDENCE
AND WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF THE DISCRETION OF
THE TRIAL COURT.

The appellant, under Point III of his brief on appeal,
argues that the attorneys fee to which the plaintiff was
entitled is governed by Title 17, Chapter 37, Sec. 9, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, because the note was secured by
the vehicle. As pointed out in the statement of facts
herein and Point I of the brief, the defendants' counsel
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in open court stipulated that his client would take over
the remains of the truck which had been removed to the
State of Arizona and largely destroyed, free and clear
of the mortgage, and that the .action should proceed as
an action on an unsecured note.
"MR. HYDE: Well, as I understand it, they
want to treat this as unsecured and take over the
property and we are agreeable to that.
"THE COURT: Then the court has no objection." (R. 10, lines 9-12.)
It was contended by the defendant that his interests would he best served if he recovered the mortgaged
property and disposed of it himself rather than subject
it to foreclosure proceedings which the defendant believed would result in his realizing less value from the
mortgaged property. Having so .agreed he should not be
heard now to say that the plaintiff's action was not
proper. The action was heard by the court at his request
as an action on an unsecured note and the defendant and
his counsel requested the court to hold a hearing for
the purpose of establishing the amount of attorney's fees
due the plaintiff under the note. (See, defendant's motion to determine the amount of attorney's fees, R. 6.)
Also, the following oral motion of defendant's counsel :

"MR. PACE: "* * * we would like to have the
court determine the amount of attorney's fees due
and this would pro hably then be the only issue
before the Court. ***". (R. 9, lines 11-13.)
"MR. HYDE : We will be happy to have the
ruling of the court on the issue of attorney's fees
in the matter." (R. 9, lines 18-19.)

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Having obtained the stipulation from the plaintiff
that the defendant could take over the truck free and
clear of the mortgage, which the defendant felt was to
his advantage, Mr. Pace stipulated and requested that
the court determine what attorneys fees should be allowed the plaintiff and further stipulated that he ·would
raise no issue as to whether or not the plaintiff was
entitled to its attorneys fees.
"MR. PACE: "* * * there is no question here
but what Mr. Hyde is entitled to attorney's fees,
I think I would stipulate to that." (Underscoring
supplied) (R. 59, lines 29-30, R. 60, line 1.)

The sole question properly raised on this appeal is
whether or not the district judge, after conducting the
hearing with reference to the amount of attorneys fees to
be allowed the plaintiff, a:bused its discretion in awarding
an attorney's fee in the amount of $1,443.10 in an action
to recover the amount of $5,890.54 due under the promissory note.
The attorneys fee awarded by the court after taking
evidence fr01n both parties with reference to the issue
amounts to 24% of the judgment awarded to the plaintiff. The defendant called the plaintiff's attorney as his
witness to describe the nature of the legal work perfornled in connection with the transaction involved in
the suit and adduced facts indicating the complexity of
the problems involved, most of which had been caused
h;r the defendant's removal of the truck from the State
of Utah and the dismantling of the truck, all of which
resulted in actions being brought against the plaintiff

14
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in the State of Arizona arising out of the efforts of the
plaintiff to recover the mortgaged property. Without
detailing the record the testimony clearly shows that
after the truck was removed to Arizona it was dismantled
and parts converted from another ve·hicle were pl,aced
upon it and as a result the repossession efforts of the
plaintiff were frustrated and the plaintiff became involved in a suit by the owner of the parts that had been
placed on the truck. The court heard evidence with
reference to what was done to recover and preserve the
mortgaged property and the efforts to negotiate a settlement of the account prior to suit and the work done in
connection with the law suit. (R. 37-51.)
It should be noted that at the trial of this issue the
defendants did not put on any evidence whatsoever to
contradict the evidence put on by the plaintiff with respect to the reasonableness of the attorneys fees requested and the court fixed the fee and found it to be
reasonable in view of the evidence before the court.

Counsel cites the case of McCormick v. Swem, 36
U. 7, 102 P. 626, which case held that the reasonableness
of the attorneys fees to be awarded is a discretionary
matter with the trial court and we have no argument
with the proposition that even where the amount of attorney's fees is agreed upon by the parties the court
may intervene if it is unfair or unjust or unreasonable.
This ease and the others cited in counsel's brief all support the position of the respondent that the question
of attorneys fees is discretionary and should not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it is apparent from
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the record that the trial court has abused its discretion
1n finding what sum should properly be awarded.
"The rule is established that, in fixing the
fees of attorneys, the court is vested with a wide
discretion and the court's award of an amount for
such fees will be disturbed only when it is manifest that there has been a palpable abuse of such
discretion." City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeleslnyo Farms Co., 25 P.2d 224, p. 227.
CONCLUSION
·The defendant-appellant stipulated to all issues in
open court and moved the court to determine the amount
of fees to be allowed the plaintiff. The appellant did
not appeal from the judgment determining the amount
due under the note and Points I, II, and IV raised on
appeal should not be considered by the court. The award
of attorneys fees was not an abuse of the discretion of
the trial court in view of the evidence adduced at the
hearing on the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded.
Respectfully submitted,
~IcBROO~f

& HYDE
401 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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